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Whole genome sequencing will soon become affordable for many 
individuals, but thorny privacy and ethical issues could jeopardize 
its popularity and thwart the large-scale adoption of genomics in 
healthcare and slow potential medical advances.
In the past decade, whole genome sequencing (WGS) has evolved from a futuristic concept to a realistic technology that yields an individual’s complete ge-nome. Each genomic sequence contains a vast amount 
of information that enables significant progress in under-
standing, treating, and preventing disease. As such, WGS 
has the potential to revolutionize healthcare.
However, a genome also contains highly sensitive in-
formation that uniquely identifies an individual. When 
technology advances eventually make WGS affordable 
for the general population, individuals will need assur-
ances about access to their genomic information. For ex-
ample, who will store the digitized genome and where? 
How will access be controlled such that no one can in-
advertently or deliberately leak genomic information to 
third parties? What will keep a healthcare provider’s ser-
vice partners from using genomic information in ways 
other than medical research or personalized medical 
treatment?
With DNA sequencing cost dropping below $1,000 
per genome, these questions have become pressing. 
Both throughput gains and the cost reductions of new- 
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ONGOING WORK TO PROTECT 
GENOMIC DATA
Over the past few years, research in genomic privacy has accelerated and now falls into 
four main categories: 
 » string searching and comparison, 
 » release of aggregate data, 
 » alignment of raw genomic data, and 
 » clinical use of genomic data, such as for 
personalized medicine. 
Work in the first category is experimenting 
with the use of medical tools and private string 
comparison for privacy-preserving paternity 
tests, personalized medicine, and genetic com-
patibility tests.1 More recently, researchers have 
extended that work to implement the GenoDroid 
toolkit.2 which provides paternity and ancestry 
testing via a smartphone.
In the second category, researchers are 
focusing on privacy risks of releasing aggregate 
genomic data.3 Others have explored the appli-
cation of differential privacy to the publication of 
aggregate genomic trial statistics.4,5 Their work 
aims to ensure that two genomic databases, 
which differ only by one individual’s data, have 
indistinguishable statistical features. Hence, the 
published result from a genomic dataset does not 
reveal the existence of a particular individual in 
that dataset.
Research in the third category is looking at 
secure and efficient algorithms for read map-
ping (aligning millions of short sequences to a 
reference DNA sequence). One recent attempt 
on this direction works in a hybrid (public and 
private) cloud environment.6 In this work, authors 
outsource the computationally intensive steps 
of the operation to a public (untrusted or com-
mercial) cloud; they propose doing sensitive and 
lightweight computations on a private (trusted) 
cloud to protect the privacy of sensitive DNA 
information.
In the last category is work to preserve the 
patient’s privacy in medical tests and personal-
ized medicine. One approach uses homomorphic 
encryption and secure multiparty computation to 
protect patients’ genomic data in this context.7,8
Some of these efforts have already materi-
alized into practical genomic testing. However, 
it is hard to foresee the range and complexity of 
future genetic operations: some tests might be 
too computationally intricate to be performed on 
a personal device, or genetic tests might involve 
multiple genomes. Consequently, we expect 
the scope and nature of genomic data protec-
tion work to change as researchers make new 
discoveries and shift their focus to address a new 
set of needs. At the same time, the efforts already 
in progress are important stepping stones to 
solutions that address the multifaceted challenge 
of protecting genomic data.
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law. Thus, it is safe to assume that, in 
a few years, most individuals in devel-
oped countries will be able to obtain 
their digitized genomes for any num-
ber of purposes—from personalized 
medicine to paternity testing. Com-
mercial entities, such as Knome and 
Illumina, already offer services that 
create reports from raw genomic data, 
which doctors use to guide treatment.
However, without a deeper under-
standing of the complex interplay be-
tween genomes and healthcare, WGS 
applications will be limited. Achiev-
ing progress in this research will re-
quire patients (or volunteers) who are 
willing to share their genetic data—an 
agreement that raises privacy protec-
tion, ethical use, and legal rights con-
cerns. For example, in the Personal Ge-
nome Project (www.personalgenomes 
.org), participants agree to make their 
genomic data and other personal in-
formation publicly available on the 
Internet. Such pilot projects offer a 
glimpse into the future concerns of 
handling large-scale genomic data.
DNA sequencing greatly exacer-
bates data exposure and exploitation 
issues that social media and personal 
health records (PHRs) have already 
brought to the forefront. The genome 
represents an individual’s biological 
identity and thus contains rich infor-
mation about that person’s ancestry. 
By combining the genomic data with 
data on the person’s environment or 
lifestyle, a third party can infer the 
individual’s phenotype, including 
predisposition to physical and mental 
health conditions (such as Alzheimer’s 
disease, cancer, or schizophrenia).
If a genomic information leak oc-
curs, revoking or replacing an indi-
vidual’s DNA sequence is impossible, 
which has serious implications for 
applications that depend on accu-
rate genomic information. The use of 
DNA analysis in law enforcement and 
healthcare, for example, is already 
prompting ethical questions, such as 
how to guarantee the genomic infor-
mation’s integrity.
Until researchers address these 
open problems, the much anticipated 
benefits of personalized medicine 
could remain on hold.
GENOMICS 101
The human genome is encoded in 
double- stranded DNA molecules that 
consist of two complementary polymer 
chains. Each chain is a series of nucle-
otides, represented as the letters A, C, 
G, and T. Technicians collect DNA sam-
ples from a person’s saliva, hair, skin, or 
blood, among other sources, and extract 
genetic material for sequencing. The re-
sulting genome is a unique string of ap-
proximately 3.2 billion letter pairs (an 
arrangement of A, C, G, and T).
The reference genome, which 
scientists have assembled as a rep-
resentation of the human genome, 
makes up 99.5 percent of a human’s 
DNA sequence. The remaining 0.5 
percent represents the individual’s 
genetic variation. Although it might 
seem insignificant relative to the 
reference genome, this minuscule 
0.5 percent corresponds to several 
million nucleotides. 
The genetic variation can take sev-
eral forms, the most common being 
single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP, 
pronounced “snip”). In simplest terms, 
a SNP is a position in the genome se-
quence with a nucleotide that varies 
between individuals. For example, in 
two sequenced DNA fragments from 
different individuals, AAGCCTA and 
AAGCTTA, the fifth nucleotide is C in 
one and T in the other.
Researchers have confirmed that 
humans have approximately 50 mil-
lion unique SNPs,1 a number that be-
comes more exact as more individuals 
consent to sequencing.
SNPs can help determine an indi-
vidual’s predisposition to certain dis-
orders or diseases. For example, recent 
genome-wide association studies show 
that the presence of three genes with 10 
particular SNPs can indicate suscepti-
bility to Alzheimer’s disease.2,3 
Interdependent SNPs sometimes re-
sult in linkage disequilibrium (LD)4—
the nonrandom association of alleles 















FIGURE 1. Genomics applications. Whole genome sequencing will enable personalized 
genomic medicine and facilitate testing for genetic disease risk and ancestry.
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from single, ancestral chromosomes, 
so LD makes it possible to infer the 
nucleotide of a SNP from the contents 
of other SNPs. This relationship obvi-
ously complicates privacy protection.
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 
AND BEYOND
WGS has the potential to bring about a 
new era of predictive, preventive, par-
ticipatory, and personalized (P4) med-
icine5 and enable applications such as 
those in Figure 1. P4 represents a sig-
nificant healthcare paradigm shift6 
from the current trial-and-error treat-
ment because it enables medication 
tailored to a patient’s precise genetic 
makeup. P4 applications include as-
sessments of disease and treatment 
risk, and paternity and ancestry test-
ing, and the evaluation of genetic 
compatibility between potential part-
ners to reduce the possibility of pass-
ing genetic diseases to their offspring.
Pharmacogenomics
Experiments have shown that certain 
genetic mutations alter drug metabo-
lism and that genomic tests can help 
predict a patient’s response to partic-
ular drugs. This experimentation and 
testing is part of pharmaco genomics—
the study of how genetic variations 
affect an individual’s response to 
medications. Examples of pharmacog-
enomics include testing for SNP muta-
tions in the tpmt gene of children with 
leukemia and pretreatment testing for 
the correlation of the BRCA1/BRCA2 
genes to familial breast and ovarian 
cancer syndromes. 
Genomic tests to determine drug 
response are expected to become more 
widespread in the near future. Experts 
estimate that about a third of the 900 
cancer drugs now in clinical trials 
could soon come to market with an 
enclosed recommendation for a DNA 
or another molecular test.7
Programs are underway to support 
pharmacogenomics. For example, 
Vanderbilt University’s Pharmacog-
enomic Resource for Enhanced Deci-
sions in Care and Treatment (Predict) 
program8 evaluates patients’ genetic 
characteristics to help physicians de-
termine which drugs are most likely 
to work, thus avoiding the long tri-
al-and-error period characteristic of 
traditional drug evaluation. In one 
case,9 Predict program researchers 
used the genetic profile of a patient 
with coronary artery disease to help 
doctors select a specific cholester-
ol-lowering drug and successfully 
treat the patient in a fraction of the 
time with a conventional approach.
Testing for genetic disease risk
Low-cost WGS will give individuals di-
rect access to their genomic informa-
tion, which they could share with sites 
that test for genetic disease risks. One 
such site, 23andMe, already provides 
relatively low-cost genetic ancestry 
and disease risk tests for 960,000 spe-
cific SNPs, although it does not yet 
offer WGS. Since November 2013, the 
US authorities have suspended the 
health-related 23andMe tests, pending 
FDA investigation; however, such tests 
are still offered in the UK. 
In parallel to direct-to-consumer ser-
vices, national and regional efforts are 
attempting to introduce genomics into 
the clinical setting. Examples include 
the UK’s 100,000 Genomes  Project (www 
.genomicsengland.co.uk) and University 
Hospital Lausanne’s biobank (www.chuv 
. c h / b i o b a n q u e / b i l _ h o m e / b i l 
-patients-famille/bil-la_bil.htm). 
Although researchers are enthu-
siastically exploring the relation-
ship of genetics and personalized 
medicine, biomedical experts have 
expressed doubts about the extent to 
which gene mapping can predict the 
likelihood of developing a disease.10 
They argue that, although scientists 
have a list of genetic features that 
correlate to certain diseases,2 they 
do not know whether (and to what 
extent) environmental factors also 
come into play.
Paternity and ancestry testing
The availability of a patient’s fully 
sequenced genome will enable clini-
cians, doctors, and testing facilities 
to run complex, correlated genetic 
tests in a matter of seconds. Com-
pared with the more expensive in vi-
tro tests, these specialized computa-
tional algorithms enable faster and 
more accurate testing while preserv-
ing legal acceptance.
Commercial entities already of-
fer ancestry and genealogical testing 
in which software compares an indi-
vidual’s genomic information with 
publicly available genomic data from 
a particular ethnic group to deter-
mine how the individual relates to 
the group. Online services also offer 
genetic compatibility tests that assess 
the risk of Mendelian inheritance11—
the chance of transmitting genetic 
diseases to any offspring—in the cou-
ple being tested. 
THREATS TO GENOMIC  
DATA PRIVACY
Many view genomic privacy with 
skepticism, since every individual 
constantly leaves behind biological 
material, such as hair, skin, or saliva—
evidence that a third party can collect 
even days later and use to construct a 
DNA sequence. However, this threat 
is credible only for a targeted individ-
ual or a small group, not for a large 
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number of digitized genomes, such as 
in a research database. 
Genomes in the latter setting face 
two main threats, as Figure 2 illus-
trates. Although existing laws pro-
tect data privacy in general, genomic 
data has certain characteristics that 
require more restrictive provisions to 
address unique privacy threats.12
Loss of donor anonymity
The primary traditional approaches 
to privacy protection are data de- 
identification or aggregation. Com-
mon de-identification strategies, 
which include deleting or masking 
identifiers, such as names and Social 
Security numbers, are ineffective for 
genomic data because the genome is 
the ultimate identifier.13
Aggregation—a strategy that 
combines data for a population—is 
also ineffective because enough pub-
lished information is available to 
identify the individual from a case 
study and, in some instances, to re-
cover parts of the genome sequence. 
For example, a 2009 study14 shows 
that even the test statistics (such as 
p-values, r-squares) calculated from 
allele frequencies and published pa-
pers give away enough information to 
identify genetic trial participants. A 
2013 study15 demonstrated that third 
parties can use information from 
popular genealogy websites along 
with other available personal data to 
re-identify (counter de- identification 
of) DNA donors from a public re-
search database.
Data leaks
Because the genomes of two closely 
related individuals are highly similar, 
the disclosure of a person’s genome 
can possibly leak significant genomic 
information about that person’s close 
relatives. This disclosure is a problem 
regardless of whether it was voluntary, 
accidental, or malicious. 
The possibility of revealing others’ 
identities makes genomic data privacy 
a unique issue, since, in most other 
sensitive scenarios, only the individ-
ual’s data is at stake. Depending on 
the number of siblings and children, 
disclosure can affect a large group.16 
Failing to consider this possibility 
can have severe consequences, as the 
recent controversy about Henrietta 
Lacks’ genome sequence attests. In 
researching Lacks’ disease nearly five 
decades ago, scientists discovered 
cell properties in her cancerous tissue 
that made the cells highly suitable for 
biogenetic research. They harvested 
more cells without the family’s knowl-
edge and began using the HeLa cell (in 
honor of Lacks’ first and last names) in 
studies. It eventually became so pop-
ular in genetics research that Lacks’ 
surviving family members began re-
ceiving requests for tissue and blood 
samples. After several court cases to 
address privacy violations, in 2013, 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
agreed to give the family some control 
over the HeLa cells’ use. 
Exacerbating the data leak prob-
lem is the genome’s immutability and 
longevity. An individual can change 
passwords, account numbers, and 
even public key certificates. The same 
is not true of a genome. Moreover, fu-
ture generations will inherit most of 
their ancestor’s DNA, so genomic in-














FIGURE 2. Two main threats to human genomic data privacy. (a) DNA donors in a public 
research database lose anonymity (de-anonymization), and (b) partial genomic data 
leakage allows outsiders to infer sensitive information. Figure used with permission from 
the US Department of Energy Genomic Science program (https://public.ornl.gov/site 
/gallery/detail.cfm?id=398&topic=&citation=&general=dna&restsection=all).
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PRIVACY PROTECTION LAWS
Clearly, privacy concerns represent 
a formidable obstacle to assembling 
large human genomic databases and 
can delay (or derail) genome-wide as-
sociation studies, which in turn could 
thwart advances in medicine and sub-
sequent healthcare improvements. In 
law enforcement, which increasingly 
uses DNA-based identification, the 
need for genomic data security and re-
liability is also evident.
Existing laws protect genomic data 
privacy to some degree. In 1990, the Na-
tional Human Genome Research Insti-
tute established the Ethical, Legal, and 
Social Implications Research Program 
to explore the repercussions of ad-
vances in genetic and genomic research 
on individuals, families, and commu-
nities. In 2008, the US government 
established the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which 
prohibits health insurance and employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of ge-
netic information. Also, the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) provides a general frame-
work for protecting and sharing health 
information, and the State of Califor-
nia has begun to consider DNA privacy 
laws.17 Meanwhile, in Europe, legisla-
tors are taking similar precautions.18
Discrimination through genetic 
data is not a new idea. As far back as 
1997, Gattaca, a popular science fic-
tion movie, touched on the notion of 
genism—the theory that genes deter-
mine distinctive human characteris-
tics and abilities—and explored the 
idea that genetic discrimination could 
be as pernicious as overt racism.
THE CASE FOR  
STRICTER POLICY
Although current legislation provides 
guidelines for genomic data use, it 
does not contain enough technical 
information about safe and secure 
ways to store and process digitized ge-
nomes. One reason is that security and 
privacy issues for genomic data—both 
individual genomes and the genome 
collections in genomic databases—are 
not well understood.
Privacy practitioners and consumer 
organizations are strongly advocating 
the need for more restrictive legisla-
tion to close current policy gaps. A re-
cent report from the US Presidential 
Commission for the Study of Bioethi-
cal Issues19 analyzed WGS advances, 
highlighted growing privacy and se-
curity concerns, and made a few pri-
vacy and security recommendations. 
We believe these recommenda-
tions reflect a general lack of under-
standing about the associated open 
technical problems. For example, 
one recommendation was to use de- 
identification, which is clearly unsuit-
able. The recommendations also fail 
to address several important points. 
For example, to guard against surrep-
titious DNA testing, any genomic data 
protection policy must recognize the 
need for informed consent. The policy 
should set forth procedures for author-
ities and companies to obtain written 
permission from an individual before 
collecting, analyzing, storing, or shar-
ing that person’s genetic information, 
such as hair or saliva samples—thus 
ensuring that no individual will be a 
victim of unauthorized sequencing.
A measure such as this will not be 
popular with those who view privacy-
f riendly measures as hindrances to 
genomic research. Scientists typically 
sequence DNA from large groups to 
determine genes associated with par-
ticular diseases. The informed con-
sent restriction would mean that they 
cannot reuse large genomic datasets to 
study a different disease. Rather, they 
would have to destroy the data after 
each study or track down all previously 
enrolled study participants and secure 
a new authorization from each for the 
next study. Also, because related indi-
viduals have similar genomes, the par-
ticipant’s relatives might have to give 
consent as well.
GUIDELINES FOR GENOMIC 
DATA PROTECTION AND USE
The individual who requests and likely 
pays for genome sequencing should 
own the result, as is already the case 
for any other personal medical infor-
mation. However, genomes are a new 
kind of personal health information, 
which raises numerous issues that 
technical approaches alone cannot ad-
dress. Rather, technology must work 
with legal and professional guidelines 
that govern how to transmit, store, 
process, and eventually dispose of ge-
nomic information.
Storage and long-term protection
Storing and protecting the genome 
raises several important questions:
 › Should the genome be stored on 
the individual’s personal device? 
What special hardware security 
features are needed to prevent 
tampering?
 › Should genome storage be out-
sourced to a cloud provider? 
 › Should the genome be en-
crypted? If so, what organiza-
tion will generate and store the 
encryption keys?
Although encryption might seem 
the ideal answer to many of these ques-
tions, it has drawbacks. Encryption 
schemes that many consider strong 
at present might gradually weaken, 
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but the genome’s sensitivity will not. 
Thus, a third party that cannot de-
crypt an encrypted genome might be 
able to do so years later. The Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) scheme 
supports key lengths up to 256 bits. Al-
though several standardization bod-
ies and intelligence agencies believe 
it will be secure for several decades,20 
computational breakthroughs or un-
foreseen weaknesses might allow 
early decryption.
One option is to periodically re- 
encrypt the genome, assuming it can-
not be copied. Another option is to use 
secret-sharing techniques to split the 
genome and partition it among several 
providers. However, efficient reassem-
bly is problematic, as is the guarantee 
that providers do not collude in ge-
nome reconstruction. Moreover, the 
providers themselves must have suffi-
cient longevity. 
Finally, encryption will not prevent 
leaks of a long-deceased individual’s 
genomic data, which can affect the pri-
vacy of that person’s living progeny.
Accessibility
Given the genome’s sensitivity, an 
individual should never disclose any 
genomic information, which would 
certainly prevent access to any ge-
nomic application except within the 
individual’s secured personal de-
vice. Although it sounds ideal, such 
a restriction might be possible if op-
erations were represented in some 
standardized form that some trusted 
agency has certified. For example, 
if testing for a genetic disease re-
quires matching a well-known pat-
tern in some approximate location 
in the genome, the US Food and Drug 
 Administration (FDA) might certify 
that pattern and its parameters. In-
dividuals would then be assured that 
the operation is a legitimate test for a 
specific genetic disease and that they 
will receive the results, which they 
then can opt to keep private.
Other questions about accessibility 
are more complicated:
 › Should the sequencing facility 
keep an escrowed copy of the 
genome?
 › Should the individual entrust 
a genome copy to his personal 
physician or health insurance 
provider?
 › Is it possible to guarantee the 
digitized genome’s integrity and 
authenticity? If so, how?
 › If backups are made, how often 
and where should they be kept?
 › Is it possible to securely erase a 
genome?
 › Should individuals periodically 
request a new genome sequence 
to keep pace with more accurate 
technology?
Testing guidelines
To effectively replace their in vitro 
counterparts, computational genomic 
tests must be accurate, efficient, and 
usable for individuals who are not 
geneticists.
Accuracy. A computational genomic 
test should guarantee accuracy that 
is at least equivalent to the in vitro 
test. For example, a computational 
paternity test should provide the 
same confidence as the in vitro test, 
which is currently admissible in a 
court of law. Computational tests 
should also strive for accountability 
by furnishing guarantees of correct-
ness for both execution and input 
information.
Efficiency. Computational genomic 
tests should incur minimal communi-
cation and computing costs. Patients 
might be used to waiting several days 
to obtain genetic test results. However, 
in a computational setting, long run-
times on personal devices might hin-
der the test’s practicality.
Usability. Computational genomic 
tests are likely to involve the general 
population, which raises several us-
ability questions: 
 › How much should the user know 
about genomic test aspects?
 › What information about the test 
and results is appropriate, and 
at what granularity should it be 
presented?
 › Do individual’s privacy per-
ceptions and concerns match 
the scientific community’s 
expectations?
The last question is particularly 
complex. Some users might be willing 
 ENCRYPTION SCHEMES THAT MANY 
CONSIDER STRONG AT PRESENT 
MIGHT GRADUALLY WEAKEN, BUT THE 
GENOME’S SENSITIVITY WILL NOT. 
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to forego their genomic privacy. For 
example, the expectation is that pa-
tients will reveal their genomes to 
their doctors so that they can benefit 
from tests that can possibly save them 
from a life-threatening disease, such 
as cancer. However, the same individ-
ual might not wish to reveal that infor-
mation to an online service or pharma-
ceutical company. 
These considerations are for the 
most part educated guesses, since few 
efforts have focused on users’ con-
cerns. Therefore, one research focus 
should be on exploratory user stud-
ies21 to elicit insights into this issue 
and address the open problem of how 
to effectively communicate the poten-
tial privacy risks associated with ge-
nomic information and its disclosure.
Affordable, readily available WGS will stimulate thrilling opportunities, but it will also 
raise privacy concerns; addressing 
both sides of WGS will require long-
term collaboration among geneticists, 
other healthcare providers, ethicists, 
lawmakers, and computer scien-
tists. To this end, we helped organize 
the first multidisciplinary Dagstuhl 
seminar on genomic privacy, which 
took place in 201322 and will be held 
again in October 2015. We also helped 
launch an international workshop on 
genomic privacy, which took place in 
2014 and will be held again in conjunc-
tion with the 2015 IEEE Symposium 
on Security and Privacy (www.geno-
pri.org). Finally, we have set up www.
genomeprivacy.org, a site that offers 
computer scientists tutorials and links 
to genome privacy research groups.
Long-term collaboration will re-
quire targeted funding support. In the 
US, genomic privacy has fallen into 
funding gap between agencies. The 
NIH funding, for example, solidly cov-
ers both bioinformatics and WGS eth-
ical issues, but only sparsely supports 
research on genomic data privacy. The 
National Science Foundation’s (NSF’s) 
Smart and Connected Health program 
includes integrative projects that re-
quire collaboration among computer 
and health sciences, but the program 
may or may not engender long-range 
genomic privacy research. 
Other US funding agencies have not, 
thus far, explicitly addressed genomic 
privacy. In Europe, numerous EU and 
nationally funded projects are focus-
ing on e-health, and some consider 
data protection, but they largely over-
look genomic data privacy. In addition, 
although most officials in charge of 
data protection typically have a strong 
legal background, they lack computer 
science expertise. Consequently and 
not surprisingly, they tend to rely on 
legislation more than on technology.
Our work is thus a call for research 
collaboration to specifically and vig-
orously address the privacy issues we 
have identified. Overcoming these ob-
stacles will free WGS to reach its full 
potential to revolutionize medicine 
and allow individuals and society over-
all to reap the considerable benefit. 
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